After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Musk’s "Starlink" satellite was launched in Ukraine with a high profile and quickly intervened in military operations, providing redundant network support for the Ukrainian government, defense and key infrastructure departments to connect to the Internet. Through "Starlink", the Ukrainian army realizes the real-time or near-real-time transmission of target intelligence data, ensuring the combat decision-making, command and control of ground strike forces such as artillery, and realizing the rapid and accurate discovery and precision strike of Russian targets.
In view of the threat posed by the "Starlink" system to maintaining the Ukrainian army’s communication capabilities and to the Russian army, the Russian army has adopted a comprehensive means of combining electronic warfare soft kill with firepower hard destruction to offset the threat of the "Starlink" system, and has achieved certain results.
Ground electronic warfare system implements electronic interference
In the first phase of combat operations, the Russian army used ground electronic warfare systems to interfere with the "Starlink" system and achieved certain results. The Russian army mainly used the "Tirada-2s mobile ground-based communication satellite jammer system" located in the Republic of Luhansk to interfere with the "Starlink" communication satellite constellation. The system mainly interferes with satellite communications in the 3~30GHz frequency band on the surface of the earth, and also has the ability to interfere with communications between military drones and satellites. Its main function is to perform recoverable soft kills, rather than destroying or permanently damaging electronic equipment.
SpaceX said on March 5, 2022 that some "Starlink" terminals were blocked and interfered for several hours in the conflict area. On the second day after the "Starlink" system was interfered with, SpaceX said it quickly "threw out a line of code and successfully repaired the "Starlink", making the interference ineffective", but the upgrade caused It caused a delay in the communication of the "Starlink" terminal. There are many statements about this incident, but the interference and destruction of the Russian electronic warfare system is definitely an important factor.
In May 2022, the Russian army’s newly developed "Shawl-K" electronic warfare system began to be used on the Ukrainian battlefield to suppress satellite ground stations and radio relay communication ground terminals. The Russian army said that it had blocked mobile communications and Internet signals in Ukraine. The special feature of "Shawl-K" is that it can suppress the communication relay equipment of the "Starlink" system, that is, it can suppress the idle channels selected independently between each user, thereby affecting the communication capabilities of the "Starlink" system.
At the end of September 2022, the "Starlink" service used by the Ukrainian army was interrupted on the front line, and the southern areas of Kherson and Zaporizhia were severely affected. Similarly, in the east of Kharkiv and Service interruptions also occurred on the Donetsk and Luhansk fronts, causing Ukraine to lose communication with frontline troops. These accidents were also caused by the interference and damage of the Ukrainian army’s "Starlink" system by the Russian army’s "Tirada-2S" ground electronic warfare system.
The "Tirada-2S" system can generate directional interference signals, interfere with satellite transceivers, and deny satellites from receiving ground signals, preventing spacecraft from interacting with ground stations and air base stations. In order to overcome the interference of "Tirada-2S", the automation system of the interfered satellite usually consumes a lot of electricity, which will cause a lot of loss to the power system on the satellite and affect the normal operation of the satellite.
In the first phase of combat operations, the Russian army The "Tirada-2S" mobile land-based communication satellite jamming system was used to interfere with the "Starlink" system, and achieved certain results, but the "Starlink" system successfully circumvented it by repairing the code. Subsequently, the Russian army seized some "Starlink" system terminals on the battlefield and transported them back to Russia for disassembly and cracking by the electronic warfare scientific research and testing department, and gradually mastered the technology and methods of cracking its key technical system.
At the end of September 2022, after the Ukrainian army launched a counterattack against the Russian army and the Russian army was repeatedly passive, the Russian army organized a counterattack against the Ukrainian army, and quickly deployed its multiple "Tirada-2S" ground electronic warfare systems in a safe area 70 kilometers away from the war zone, focusing on Kherson and southern Zaporizhia, while carrying out continuous electronic jamming on the eastern part of Kharkov and the front lines of Donetsk and Luhansk. The interference effect was significant. The "Starlink" system terminals in the relevant areas were basically unable to work, resulting in delays in Ukrainian command and control communications or confusion. The Russian army took the opportunity to launch an annihilation war against the Ukrainian army, which had lost its communication and command capabilities and was trapped in a state of fighting on its own.
Ukrainian troops were located through "Starlink" terminals
The Russian army used electronic warfare means to detect the electromagnetic radiation signals of the "Starlink" system terminals, locate them, and call for artillery coverage. The "Palanting" electronic reconnaissance and jamming system announced by the Russian Ministry of Defense on June 13, 2022 played an outstanding role in reconnaissance and positioning of "Starlink" system terminals.
The "Palanting" system mainly relies on two sets of antennas to function, one is an omnidirectional frequency and direction-finding antenna, and the other is a highly directional jamming antenna. When working, the "Palanting" system relies on frequency and direction-finding antennas to determine the location of the Ukrainian "Starlink" system terminals. It generally uses multi-vehicle multi-point direction finding and cross-positioning. Since the "Palanting" system itself works in a multi-vehicle network, cross-positioning is particularly convenient. The "Starlink" system terminals are mostly deployed in the Ukrainian army’s battalion-level and brigade-level command posts. The terminals are generally within 2 kilometers of the command post. Therefore, as long as the "Starlink" system terminal is located, the drone can be used to conduct reconnaissance in the area within 2 kilometers of the "Starlink" system terminal. After the drone finds and locates the Ukrainian army command post, it can call artillery or use high-precision weapons to carry out a decapitation attack on the Ukrainian army command post.
Fork positioning is particularly convenient. The "Starlink" system terminals are mostly configured in the Ukrainian army’s battalion-level and brigade-level command posts. The terminals are generally within 2 kilometers of the command post. Therefore, as long as the "Starlink" system terminal is located, the drone can be used to conduct reconnaissance in the area within 2 kilometers of the "Starlink" system terminal. After the drone finds and locates the Ukrainian army command post, it can call artillery or use high-precision weapons to carry out a decapitation attack on the Ukrainian army command post.
Development of special detection equipment
In December 2022, the Russian army developed a "Starlink" system terminal detection radar called "Baizhi", which can detect and determine the position of the "Starlink" system terminal within a distance of 10 kilometers and a 180-degree sector. The system uses triangulation algorithms to find and calculate the location of Starlink system user equipment. Each direction finding point takes no more than 15 minutes with an accuracy of 60 meters. The system can be installed on the chassis of a vehicle to ensure tactical mobility on the front line. The system is powered by a small power supply or a vehicle power system, and its components can be painted with various camouflages, including infrared reflective coatings. The received Starlink system terminal location data is processed in a modern graphical interface created according to the UI/UX method. The interface can be connected to the terrain map of the area for intuitive positioning.
Generally, the WIFI signal of a single Starlink system terminal can cover a range of hundreds of meters around it. The farther away from the Starlink system terminal, the weaker the signal strength. In order to ensure signal communication, the Ukrainian military command and the troops responsible for communication will not be too far away from the Starlink system terminal. After the Russian army detects the Starlink system terminal in Suledar, it will use rocket launchers to intensively bomb the relevant area. In the battle between Russia and Ukraine in Suledar, the Ukrainian army repeatedly exposed its lurking position due to the communication signals radiated by the "Starlink" system terminal, and was bombed by Russian artillery or encircled by Wagner mercenaries.
In the battle of Suledar, the Ukrainian army headquarters stationed in Suledar was also covered by Russian rocket launchers because the "Starlink" system terminal exposed its position information. At the same time, the Russian army would activate the "Tirada-2S" electronic warfare system to implement satellite communication interference when launching artillery strikes, making it impossible for the Ukrainian army to communicate. Suledar’s mine defense system fell into a situation of fighting on its own due to the loss of command. Wagner mercenaries took advantage of the chaos to launch an attack, and divided and surrounded the Ukrainian army, annihilated a large number of Ukrainian troops, and finally forced the Ukrainian army to withdraw northward from Suledar.
The "Baizhi" system was also quickly applied to the Bakhmut battlefield. In actual combat, it repeatedly guided Russian artillery to destroy the "Starlink" system terminals and the Ukrainian communication command post deployed near the "Starlink" system terminals, cutting off the Ukrainian army’s communication contacts, forcing the Ukrainian army to be unable to coordinate and fall into the dilemma of fighting alone. In the end, the Ukrainian army was defeated in Bakhmut.
Communication blocking for the Ukrainian army
Since the first generation of "Starlink" satellites do not have intersatellite link forwarding capabilities, the "Starlink" system provides communication services for Ukraine mainly thanks to the three "Starlink" system gateways built by SpaceX in Turkey, Poland and Lithuania. These gateways can allow more than half of Ukraine’s territory, including the west including Kiev and the south including Mariupol, to use the "Starlink" system services. However, the eastern part of Ukraine, where the fighting is most intense, is not within the available area of the first-generation satellites. Only when a small number of second-generation satellites pass through, can the "Starlink" system terminal connect to the satellite for short-term communication.
Therefore, in the second phase of the Russian military’s combat operations in the eastern part of Ukraine, it made full use of communication interference means to basically cut off the wireless communication means of the Ukrainian army in the eastern part of Ukraine, forcing the Ukrainian army into a desperate situation where the superiors and subordinates lost contact, the accusation was invalid, and the fighting will was weak.
The main communication electronic warfare systems used by the Russian army include "Borisoglebsk-2", "Resident" and "Palanting". Through these electronic warfare systems, the Russian army created a 1,000-kilometer interference belt in the eastern part of Ukraine, which is also one of the reasons for the large-scale surrender of the Ukrainian army in May.
However, with the launch of more second-generation satellites by SpaceX, the battlefield in eastern Ukraine can basically use the "Starlink" system terminal for communication. The Ukrainian army used a large number of "Starlink" system terminals to communicate in the counterattack, ensuring the smooth command and control of the Ukrainian army on the battlefield, laying the foundation for the Ukrainian army’s counterattack. With the increase of SpaceX’s second-generation satellites and the addition of inter-satellite forwarding communication functions, the communication coverage capability has been enhanced, and the destruction of a single-point satellite will no longer cause damage to the regional satellite network.
Deploy anti-satellite weapons for deterrence
The Russian military announced on May 18, 2022 that the Russian Aerospace Forces had equipped the "Peresvet" laser weapon system, which can paralyze satellites with an orbital altitude of less than 1,500 kilometers and is very suitable for use as an anti-satellite weapon. The laser weapon system has the following three main characteristics:
First, it has a fast attack speed. It has an attack speed of the speed of light and is currently the fastest weapon system in the world. It has a unique advantage in anti-satellite.
Second, it has high linear energy concentration. Its power is very large, and it can gather super-strong "linear" energy to minimize scattering to attack satellites. Due to its special attack principle, the "ammunition" is almost unlimited, and it is cost-effective to attack low-cost satellites such as the "Starlink" system.
Third, it has strong interference capability. The laser it emits is often not enough to destroy the target equipment. It mainly uses its powerful interference capability to temporarily blind the enemy.
Although the "Peresvet" laser weapon system can effectively destroy satellites, direct attacks on the "Starlink" system satellite space station are likely to cause disputes between Russia and the United States. Therefore, under normal circumstances, the Russian army will be cautious in using methods of directly attacking satellite uplinks. This move has a greater deterrent significance, and its purpose is to force SpaceX to be cautious in supporting Ukraine.
Space-based means to deal with "Starlink"
According to Russian media reports, the Russian army is studying the use of space electronic warfare systems to fight against the "Starlink" system. On April 15, 2022, Russia announced plans to establish a space electronic warfare force based on a satellite constellation. The Russian military plans to launch a companion satellite platform in the same orbit as the Starlink system, and use similar sniffing methods to collect the spectrum, time domain and spatial interleaving distribution, power density, duty cycle and other characteristics of the Starlink system satellite downlink channel, and then downlink it to the ground signal gateway for big data analysis, and use the information obtained to carry out electronic interference.
In 2022, the Russian army launched a total of 13 surveillance satellites. Most of these satellites are located in orbits 300 to 2,000 kilometers from the ground. The main function of the satellite is not to observe the ground, but to monitor the surrounding environment, intercept or interfere with the communication or reconnaissance operations of other satellites through its payload, and even directly attack other satellites. During the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian army has repeatedly stated that it does not rule out the use of Western commercial satellites that aid Ukraine as legitimate targets, and this is its confidence. For example, Russia launched the Kosmos-2558 satellite to the same orbital plane as the US Army’s USA-326, and has been regularly approaching US spacecraft. The relevant technology is also suitable for use against the "Starlink" system satellite.
Against the background of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Russia has accelerated the deployment of reconnaissance and surveillance satellites, exceeding the previous deployment speed. For example, on April 7 and November 30, 2022, Russia launched the "Lotus"-S satellite 5 and 6 respectively. The "Lotus" series of satellites are part of the new generation of "Vine" electronic reconnaissance satellite integrated system developed by Russia. They are mainly used to intercept and listen to enemy radio transmission signals, track the movement of enemy land vehicles, air aircraft and sea vessels, and form a real-time indication map of target movement. The Russian General Staff can use it to detect small objects around the world and provide support for precision strikes.
After that, the Russian Space Forces also launched the "Cheetah" M-3 and Kosmos-2560 satellites in succession. The former is the third satellite of the new generation of optical mapping satellites developed by the Russian Ministry of Defense. The satellite payload includes a dual-wavelength laser altimeter and a Karat optoelectronic integrated instrument. The latter consists of a wide-field camera and a high-resolution camera. The resolution of the high-resolution camera is about 1 meter. The latter is a small military optical reconnaissance satellite, operating in a sun-synchronous orbit with a resolution of about 0.9 meters.
In addition to launching military reconnaissance satellites, Russia also plans to develop satellite constellations to counter "Starlink". Yuri Ulrich, the first deputy general manager of the Russian Space Agency, said that Russia has approved a grant of 96 billion rubles (about 1.6 billion US dollars) for the construction of the "Sphere" satellite constellation. A major feature of the "Sphere" constellation is that it has multiple capabilities such as communication, navigation, remote sensing and the Internet of Things. Its positioning is a "comprehensive ecosystem of space service applications", which is in line with the current development direction of the integrated constellation capabilities of aerospace information services. Among them, intersatellite laser communication is a key content of the "sphere" constellation technology research. Compared with traditional radio data transmission, satellite laser communication technology can increase the data transmission rate by 10 to 100 times. It is an important means to solve the bandwidth bottleneck of satellite microwave communication, alleviate the shortage of satellite spectrum resources, and realize satellite high-speed communication. It is an important means to realize systematic constellations.
Actual combat application style
Use satellite reconnaissance to assist precision-guided weapons to carry out precise strikes on deep targets in the Ukrainian defense zone.
In the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukrainian military command posts, electronic intelligence centers, radar station training centers, airports, air defense missile positions, military factory equipment repair centers, ammunition depots and fuel and other military facilities have always been the key targets of the Russian military’s long-range precision strikes. The premise of implementing precision strikes is to find the precise location information of related facilities and pass the information to the Russian military missile launch command and control system.
In this process, Russian military satellite reconnaissance played an important role. The Russian army used radar imaging, optical imaging, electronic reconnaissance and other means, supplemented by special operations personnel on-site authentication and verification, to gradually find out the relevant location information, and pass the relevant information to the fire strike force through the military command automation system. The fire strike force used precision-guided weapons such as "Caliber" cruise missiles, "Iskander" ballistic missiles, "Dagger" hypersonic missiles, Kh-59MK2 air-to-ground missiles, UPAB-1500B guided air bombs, and KH-31P anti-radiation missiles to carry out fire strikes on Ukrainian air force airports, command posts, naval bases, and radar stations of S-300 and BUK-M air defense missiles, gradually paralyzing or destroying key Ukrainian military facilities.
Guiding fighters and air defense systems to fight Ukrainian fighters in the air.
In the combat operation to seize and maintain air superiority on the Ukrainian battlefield, after the Russian C4ISR system searches for the take-off information of the Ukrainian fighter jets, it quickly transmits the target location information to the air defense troops or aerospace forces that are suitable for attacking through the command and control system. If it is suitable for the air defense troops to attack, the air defense troops will launch air defense missiles to shoot down the Ukrainian fighter jets at the first time: if it is suitable for the aerospace forces fighter jets to take off to meet the enemy, the Russian aerospace forces fighter jets can raid the Ukrainian fighter jets under the guidance of the A-50 early warning aircraft.
Because the A-50 early warning aircraft played a good target guidance role, the Russian aerospace forces fighter jets in the Russian-Ukrainian war could attack the Ukrainian fighter jets without turning on the radar, causing the Ukrainian fighter jets to lose the warning time, greatly improving the suddenness and success rate of the attack. This is also one of the reasons why the Ukrainian fighter jets were basically killed instantly by the Russian fighter jets in the air battle. The survival rate of Ukrainian aircraft on the battlefield is extremely low, all because after taking off, Ukrainian fighters are easily discovered by the Russian surveillance system and then shot down by Russian air defense weapons or fighters.
Accurately detect random radiation sources on the battlefield.
The Ukrainian army’s battlefield random radiation sources mainly include air defense radars, anti-artillery radars, electronic jamming equipment, communication command equipment, etc. The relevant equipment will be able to command and guide the Ukrainian army’s firepower to attack the Russian army. Therefore, for the Russian army, detecting random radiation sources as soon as possible and destroying them is the primary link to avoid combat damage.
In the first phase of the operation, the Russian military’s ability to strike random radiation sources was obviously insufficient, causing the Russian Aerospace Forces and ground forces to be repeatedly attacked by the Ukrainian army, resulting in combat losses. In the second phase of the operation, the Russian military adjusted its strategic deployment and focused its main monitoring forces on the Donbass region. At the same time, it strengthened the efficiency and connectivity of the communication command and control system, which greatly improved the Russian military’s ability to detect and strike random radiation sources.
At long distances, Russia uses Tu-214R radio technology and optoelectronic reconnaissance aircraft to detect battlefield radiation sources, and then sends target information to the command center, which chooses the strike method. At close range, the Mi-8MTPR-1 electronic warfare helicopter is used to monitor radiation sources within the defense zone. After detecting the radio signal, the radiation source information is automatically transmitted to the firepower strike force through the command and control system, and artillery coverage is implemented on the random radiation sources. In addition, the Russian army also detects random radiation sources through ground search radars, anti-artillery radars, vehicle-mounted reconnaissance equipment and electronic warfare systems, and transmits them to firepower strike equipment through the electronic warfare integrated command and control system. Small-unit assault operations use portable individual radars to detect the battlefield, and then guide Russian armored vehicles and tanks to carry out precise firepower destruction of targets.
UAVs monitor and locate and guide artillery operations.
The Russian Army’s reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-firepower chains have demonstrated high efficiency in destroying Ukrainian military facilities. Reconnaissance-strike and reconnaissance-firepower chains refer to "control point-automatic communication system-drone-artillery" and "control point-automatic communication system-drone-aviation/missile system."
The Russian Army has formed a rapid firepower strike capability from discovery to destruction through networking. For example, in anti-artillery combat, the Russian Army used drones to detect the location of the Ukrainian Army’s multiple rocket launchers, and then sent the location information to the command post through the automatic communication system. The command post then made a strike decision and assigned the Russian Army’s artillery company to destroy the Ukrainian Army’s positions with firepower, while using drones to re-confirm the location of the firepower strike target and correct the firepower. The speed at which the Russian commander’s orders are transmitted in the command and control link is close to real time, and the average time interval from the discovery of the target to the implementation of the strike is 3-5 minutes. Among them, the "Sea Eagle-10" UAV has the most significant performance.
The "Sea Eagle-10" UAV detachment conducts reconnaissance on the target area according to the received mission. The UAV operator located in the forward command post relies on the various optoelectronic equipment carried by the "Sea Eagle-10" to conduct reconnaissance and discover the Ukrainian army’s carefully camouflaged towed artillery. Then guide the self-propelled howitzer unit to destroy the Ukrainian target. The UAV operator sends the coordinates of the Ukrainian towed artillery obtained by the "Sea Eagle-10" to the "Msta River-S" automatic howitzer and provides it with calibration. The "Msta River-S" self-propelled howitzer fired and accurately destroyed the target. The strike effect is evaluated based on the images sent back by the "Sea Eagle-10" to confirm that the target has been destroyed.
Laying underground communication cables to avoid self-disturbance.
In the case of communication suppression, the Russian army avoids interference by laying underground communication cables in order to prevent "self-damage of 1,000 and injury of 800 enemies". Once the Russian army occupies an advantageous position, it rarely changes its position, mainly because the Russian army has strong electronic protection capabilities. In the absence of Western assistance, the Ukrainian army lacks the ability to effectively strike the Russian army. The Ukrainian army’s drones, high-precision Cruise missiles, artillery shells, and communication equipment all rely on signals from satellite radio navigation systems for positioning. The Russian military usually suppresses satellite navigation signals through the "Polye-21" and R-330Zh "Residents" to perform omnidirectional interference at maximum power.
However, these two systems may interfere with the Russian military’s "Sea Eagle-10" drone when in use, affecting the effectiveness of the Russian military’s command and control. To this end, the Russian military’s countermeasure is to lay underground communication optical cables for the command post. The Russian military deploys the optical cables within hours of establishing a new position, and when artillery may need precise satellite positioning, the Russian military will shut down these two electronic warfare systems.
